Analytical comments | Personal views | Public Figures

Wednesday, April 7th 1999

When Should One Admit Defeat?

    Q: The question 'at which point should one admit defeat' may be imposed to both sides.

    A: The real question is, of course, 'at which point do these sides accomplish what they can present to their audience as victory'.

    I will try to give some elements, based on the little that I see and hear, while letting the others fill in the details. (And only after that we may try to evaluate them, determine their relationship etc.)

    NATO side:

    A: realizing strategic goals:

1. strengthening their prestige as the only armed force that dominates Europe. It will then able in the future to react whenever it desires, even outside Europe, in the regional conflicts of a lesser rank (such as ours)

2. evaluation, adjustment and further construction of the military and logistic potential for the conflicts of a lesser rank (with the tendency of the Alliance to prepare for the conflicts of the mid rank - potential alliances of a number of smaller states or a medium sized state);

3. dominance and affirmation of the US within the Alliance itself and proof that the US holds the key to security in Europe;

    B. Problems:

1. Europe's insufficient readiness (except for Great Britain) to follow these aspirations;

2. Russia's resistance (apparently stronger among the people than on top)

    C: regional goals:

1. faster penetration of the NATO into the Balkans;

2. stronger political domination of the region

    Our side:

1. fortification of SM's current regime in power - by inevitable homogenization of the people during foreign aggression and preservation of the state infrastructure, vital for the regime;

2. endeavor to avoid foreign military presence controlled by NATO (i.e. at least by its part lead by US)

3. keeping Kosovo in some kind of formal bond within FRY, so that it is not 'lost' - for this could endanger item 1.

Where do these items meet?

    After 14-15 days one can notice that NATO is on its way to fulfill all three of its strategic goals, as well as both of the regional ones, but since it hasn't fulfilled them yet (due to the two stated problems, above all), it has some time left to act and turn the scale regarding problem B1 and especially goal C1. This means that the thing above our heads could go on for as least this long. Afterwards NATO may declare victory, probably somewhere around its birthday celebration in the last week of April. (then that they may smack us occasionally, just like Sadam, but that depends on many other future events; it is more probable that, after they put an end to our strategic resources such as gas, they will achieve goal C2 by trading financial aid for political cessions, i.e. that they are planning to control SM in this way.)    

    As for our side, it has for the most part already attained victory, because goal 1 has been accomplished and it may even be able to compromise with the other side about goal 2. Goal 3 is more about the future than the current situation.

    Of course, it is possible that something dramatic may happen. Some tactic goals may alter time and manner of the fulfillment of the strategic goals (in the times of war every element has its 'sensible zone', the usual causality turns into an 'incident field' etc.). Such are certain losses on the aggressor side (which would, in my opinion, enrage them rather than turn them away), as well as losses in our army (these losses, however, still don't endanger our side's goal 1, though they weaken its position). NATO has a way to prolong this Shit we are in by trying to make room for the renewed entrance of the so called KLA, thus finding justification for extending the attacks (in general, their major problem is legitimity of this operation, ever so often the war is in crisis and a spur must be sought) etc. These complications of a lesser rank and the ongoing events may prolong the Shit, but they cannot endanger the essence of their goals and the true goal of our side, so the Victories (not Victory) are in sight, and both sides are slowly moving to that 'target'    

    As you see, if my humble opinion can manage to find its way about what I am seeing around me (and especially above me) we have very little say in this Shit (not as flesh for the airplanes) and the Albanians have even less, almost none at all. The major decisions are in the hands of SM and his (probably secret) negotiations with Washington, with Russians and Vatican playing the role of mediators, and will do even more so in the future, as well as the Italians, French and Germans. Due to the course of events in the last 15 days, SM is not doing his job so badly (he is swimming well in the shallow-tactic situation), while my fear regarding the long-term goals (numbers 2 and 3) is getting bigger.

    I probably left out many things; it is because I tried to stick to the most important ones.


Novak,
39 years, philosopher



Analytical comments | Personal views | Public Figures
srpski english